February 2012 Archives

This article appeared in the Deseret News yesterday.

Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in February of 2009. If you will recall, at the time it was touted by its proponents as an economic treatment for the recession caused by the housing financial crisis that preceded it.

In trying to determine if the stimulus package worked, we first need to define what "worked" means in this context.  What is success for a stimulus package?  When the stimulus was being considered in 2009 the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) released a report predicting what would happen to the US economy if the stimulus were passed and contrasted this with what would happen if it didn't pass.  The unemployment rate was predicted to peak at just over 9% during 2010 and run between 8 and 8.5% in early 2011 if the stimulus package did not pass.  With the stimulus, the unemployment rate was supposed to peak at just under 8% at the end of 2009 and would run between 6.5 and 7% for the first half of 2011.

In reality the unemployment rate peaked at 10.1% in October of 2009 and is currently inching down slowly to its most recently reported values 8.3%.  Clearly by the standards of the CEA report the stimulus did not "work".  If fact, one might argue it worked negatively, since the actual outcome was worse than what was predicted if congress did not act.  The problem with such comparisons is that it is difficult or impossible to establish a counterfactual.  What really would have happened if the stimulus had not passed?

Proponents argue that the stimulus helped because things would have been even worse without it. Unfortunately, the validity of that argument cannot be tested, since we can't rerun the economy starting in February 2009 without the stimulus.  Over any lengthy span of time a great number of random, unpredictable events will occur that effect the economy.  If we could rerun the economy a thousand times we would get a thousand different sets of random outcomes.  If these events really are random and unpredictable before they happen, it is pointless to argue that something different should have been done.  Rather than ask if a policy was appropriate given what we know now, a more important question is if the policy was appropriate given what was known when it was put in place.  

The notion of fiscal stimulus is based on the work of John Maynard Keynes who wrote much of his most influential work based on his observations of the Great Depression.  Keynes argued for government spending as a way to stimulate the economy because he observed firms and workers ready and willing to produce goods and services at the prevailing prices if only they could find someone willing to buy.  If this is really the case, then government spending leads to purchases that would not otherwise occur.  Traditional Keynesian theory argues that a $1 increase in government spending will lead to a much more that $1 increase in economic activity because the workers and firms that sell to the government will earn income which they will, in turn, spend on other goods.  This is the notion behind a government spending "multiplier."

Suppose, however, that firms did not stand ready to produce any amount of goods at prevailing prices.  Instead suppose that when the government buys goods it increases their demand and causes prices for the goods it buys to rise.  In this case, the higher price will make private consumers and firms cut back on their purchases and the government ends up "crowding out" private purchases.  In this case the government multiplier may be a number less than one, possibly even close to zero.  That is, a $1 increase in government spending increases economic activity by less than $1 or perhaps by nothing at all.

Professor Robert Barro of Harvard University has estimated that unexpected increases in government military spending have multipliers of .8 or so.  This is in sharp contrast to multipliers of 1.5, 2.0 or even 3.0 that are assumed in some traditional Keynesian models.

So did the 2009 stimulus package work?  No, in the sense that it did not work as advertised.  The actual performance of the economy has been much worse than the worst-case scenario envisioned in early 2009.  On reason for this failure may be that fiscal stimulus is really not as effective in our modern economy as it might have been in the 1930's.  There are, of course, other methods for stimulating economic activity.  These would include reducing taxes on economic activity, particularly on investment in new capital goods. 

Does the economy need another stimulus to avoid a "double-dip" recession?  Given what I observe from the last stimulus package, I would say no.
From the Deseret News this last Tuesday.

In terms of public opinion, the past couple of years have not been kind to people who work in financial markets.  The subprime mortgage meltdown and recession have generated negative feelings among a substantial number of Americans toward financial markets and the people who profit from them.  Recent rhetoric in the Republican presidential primaries concerning Mitt Romney's role at Bain Capital and Bain's role in the economy has revived the issue.

Are financial markets a net benefit to society?  Or are they an instrument for exploitation of one group of people for the benefit of another?  To answer these questions we need to understand what exactly it is that financial markets do.

Financial markets exist to do a variety of things.  One role they serve is to move wealth around over time.  Very rarely is it best for a person to consume all of his income as soon as it is received.  Financial markets facilitate delayed (or accelerated) consumption by allowing consumers to purchase financial assets today when they have a lot of income, and sell them later when their income level is low.  In economics this is referred to as the consumption-smoothing motive, since it is driven by a desire to keep consumption constant over time, or at least to have it change gradually if it does change.

Middle-aged workers generally want to save because they realize they will have much lower income after they retire.  Young and old consumers, on the other hand, often want to dissave.  Young people may borrow when young to finance an education, for example.  Retirees want to draw down their savings so they can continue to consume at a level close to what they did while working.  This type of trade can be supported by relatively simple financial assets, like bank loans, or bonds.

Another role that these markets serve requires more sophisticated financial assets, however.  That is the buying and selling of riskiness.

Some types of risk can be completely eliminated by appropriately diversifying.  Auto insurance is a good example.  The insurance company collects premiums from all its customers and makes payments equal to damages for those who have accidents.  With a large number of customers the payouts over a given period of time can be predicted quite accurately.  In the end all the customers end up mostly the same when it comes to their cars.  They have all paid the premium and they all have a working car.

Some other types of risk cannot be eliminated by diversification.  This type of risk is called aggregate risk.  Even though it can't be eliminated, it can be transferred.  This is perhaps the most important role that financial markets serve.  Some people, like myself, are very averse to risk.  They are often referred to as "hedgers".  They buy relatively large amounts of insurance and they take safe jobs at places like universities.  Other people, like my next-door neighbor, Brent, are less averse to risk.  We call these people "speculators".  They tend to buy less insurance, or buy policies with larger deductibles, and they are more willing to take jobs that have greater income risk, like being self-employed.

Suppose I unexpectedly inherit an old abandoned gold mine from a rich relative.  No one knows if the mine still has any gold in it.  Suppose the mine has a 50% chance of being worthless and a 50% chance of generating a million dollars in profit.  This is a risky asset.  I don't like risk. My neighbor, Brent, doesn't really like it either, but is more tolerant of risk.  I could offer to sell the mine to Brent for $450,000.  I would prefer have $450,000 for sure than the risky mine.  Brent will end up with a net profit of $550,000 if the mine is viable and a net loss of $450,000 if it is not.  As a result I end up with a much safer portfolio but lose an average of $50,000.  Brent ends up with an average of $50,000 more than before, but his income is really risky.

In terms of dollars this is a zero sum game.  It appears Brent gained $50,000 at my expense.  Before anyone starts occupying his front yard, note that in terms of overall well-being, we both end up better off.  I am happy to take my loss in order to avoid risk and Brent is happy to accept that risk in exchange for $50,000. 

One of the things financial markets do in general is transfer both risk and wealth to people who are less risk averse from people who are more risk averse.  As a result some people end up quite wealthy (Brent nets more than half a million dollars if the mine pans out), but they offered something of real value in exchange.  They took on risk that other people did not want to face.

As with any group there are a few dishonest and immoral people dealing in financial markets.  But generally speaking high payoffs are a payment for willingness to take on risk.  Financial markets, rather than being arenas for fraud and theft, are efficient ways of reallocating risk to for the benefit of all participants.

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